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VIRGINIA BELL TAYLOR, Appellant, v. A.. J. HAWKIN-
SON, Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Decisions Appealable.-A judgment and an order 
denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are 
appealable, but not the jury verdict or an order denying a 
new trial. 
[2] Judgmenta-Res Judicata-Identities Demanded: Estoppel ID 
Action on Different Causa.-Where the causes of action and 
the parties are the same, a prior judgment is a complete bar 
to a second action; and wbere tbe causes of action are different 
but the parties are the same, the doctrine of rea judicata ap-
plies so aa to render conclusive matters which were c1ecided 
in the first judgment. 
[8] Id.-Res Judicata-Identity of Causes of Action: Katters Con-
c1uded.-A prior judgment operates as a bar against a second 
action on the same cause, but in a later action on a different 
claim or cause it operates aa an estoppel or conclusive adjudi-
cation as to such issues in the second action as were actually 
litigated and determined in the first. 
[t] Appeal-Objections-New Trial-Verdict.-m an action by 
husband and wife and the driver of an automobile in which 
the wife was riding for damages arising out of a collision, 
where the evidence supported the trial court's implied ftnding 
that the verdicts for plaintiffa following the first trial were 
compromise verdicts and that the jury did not determine the 
issue of liability, and where the wife's motion for Dew trial 
was granted on the ground that the damages were insuftlcient, 
failure of defendant or plaintJff's husband and the driver to 
move for a Dew trial was tantamount to acceptiDg the iarT. 
compromise as their own. 
(6] Judgmenta-lLea Judicata-J/[atters .ot Adjudicate4.-m an 
action by husband and wife and the driver of an automobile 
in which the wife was riding for damages arising out of a 
collision, compromise verdicts for plaintiffs did Dot constitute 
nch a determination of the issues of liability as to render 
them res judicata on subsequent retrial of the action where 
the wife, who alone was granted a motion for Dew trial on the 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2el, Judgments, § 214 et seq.; Am..Tur., Judgments, 
5161 et seq. 
iricK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, I§ 26,48.1,74; (2] 
Judgments, II 355, 367; [3] Judgments, 11357, 395(1); [4] Ap-




ground that the damages were insufticient, .ought to ___ .,""""" 
trial to the issue of damages on the ground that the JUalgm'~~1 
in favor of her husband and the driver was conclusive agoLUIII'lol 
defendant on the issue of liability, since defendant 
have his day in court during the first trial on the issue 
liability. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Angeles County, from a jury verdict, and from orders deny-
ing motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for 
new trial. Walter R. Evans, Judge.- Judgment and 
denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the veJ~dil!lt1 
affirmed; appeal from jury verdict and order denying a 
trial, dismissed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a 
collision of vehicles. Judgment for defendant affirmed. .. 
N. E. Youngblood and William R. Grant for Appellant. 
Wyman & Finell and Saul Grayson for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Virginia Taylor, hereinafter referred to 
as plaintiff, was injured when the car in which she was riding 
was struck from the rear by a car driven by defendant. The 
ear was registered in the name of her husband and was being 
driven by a friend, Lamine Holibaugh. Plaintiff, her hus-
band, and the driver brought an action for damages against 
defendant, and the jury returned verdicts of $65 for personal 
injuries suffered by the driver, $63.06 in favor of plaintiff's 
husband for damages to the car. and $371.94 for personal 
injuries suffered by plaintiff. Judgment· was entered on the l 
verdicts, and plaintiff alone moved for a new trial on the 
ground that the damages were insufficient. Her motion was 
granted and thereafter the judgment in favor of her husband 
and the driver became final. On retrial plaintiff sought to 
limit the trial to the issue of damages on the ground that 
the judgment in favor of her husband and the driver was 
conclusive against defendant on the issue of liability. Over 
her objection the trial court submitted the issue of liability 
to the jury, which returned a verdict for defendant. Judg-
ment was entered on the verdict, and plaintiff's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, 
eA.uipecl b;y Chairman of Judicial Oouncil. 
) 
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for a new trial was denied. [1] Plaintiff appeals from the 
judgment, jury verdict, and the order denying her motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. 
Since only the judgment and the order denying the motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are appealable 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 963), the other appeals are dismissed. 
Plaintiff contends that this case is governed by the rule 
stated in" Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 813 
[122 P.2d 892], that "In determining the validity of a plea 
of res judicata three questions are pertinent: Was the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one 
presented in the action in question' Was there a final judg-
ment on the merits' Was the party against whom the plea 
is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication'" Moreover, she asserts that even if a require-
ment of mutuality of estoppel should be deemed essential in 
this case, it is met by the fact that she was in privity with 
her husband in his cause of action for damages to the car. 
(Zaragosa v. Oraven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 321 [202 P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R. 
2d 461].) Defendant contends, on the other hand, that even 
though the judgment in favor of the husband and the driver 
may be final for some purposes, since it was entered in 
the same action in which plaintiff's motion for a new trial 
was granted and since the issue of defendant's negligence was 
common to all parts of the first judgment, the part as to .which 
a new trial was neither sought nor granted cannot be res 
judicata as to the issues set at large by the granting of 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. (See American Enterprise, 
Inc. v. Van Winkle, 39 Cal.2d 210, 218 [246 P.2d 935].) 
It may be eonceded that the judgment in favor of plaintiff's 
husband and the driver is now final, that their causes of action 
are merged therein, and that it constitutes a bar to any 
further prosecution of their original claims. [2] As was 
pointed out in Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Cal.2d 195, 201-202 [99 
P.2d 652,101 P.2d 497] ; the doctrine of res judicata has two 
aspects. "First, where the causes of action and the parties 
are the same, a prior judgment is a complete bar in the 
second action. This is fundamental and is everywhere con-
ceded. 
"Second, where the causes of action are different but the 
parties are the same, the doctrine applies so as to render 
conclusive matters which were decided by the first judgment. 
[8] As this court said in Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 
695 (28 P.2d 916] :' A prior judgment operates as a bar against 
) 
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a second action upon the same cause, but in a later actiob 
upon a different claim or cause of action, it operates as an 
estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the 
second action as were actually litigated and determined in 
the tirst action.'" In the present case, since plaintiff's cause 
of action is different from those of her husband and the 
driver, we are concerned with the second aspect stated above, 
and the question presented is whether defendant's liability 
was a matter decided or an issue that was actually litigated 
and .determined within the meaning of the foregoing role. 
[4] There is ample evidence to support the trial court's' 
implied finding that the verdicts following the first trial were 
compromise verdicts and that the jury did not determine 
the issue of liability. The damages awarded plaintiff were 
less than her special damages, and the parties concede that 
they were so inadequate that a new trial limited to the issue 
of damages would have been improper. (See Rose v. Melody 
Lane, 39 Oa1.2d 481, 489 [247 P.2d 335].) Moreover, it is 
obvious that if the jury failed to determine the issue of 
liability in returning the verdict for plaintiff, it also failed 
to determine that issue in returning the verdicts for her 
husband and the driver. Accordingly, had defendant or 
plaintiff's husband and the driver moved for a new trial, 
it would have been granted, and their failure to do so was 
tantamount to accepting the jury's compromise as their 
own. (See Leiperl v. Honold, 39 Oa1.2d 462, 470-471 [247 
P.2d 324, 29 A.L.R.2d 1185].) [6] Regardless of the effec-
tiveness of such a compromise in extinguishing "the causes 
of action or in settling the rights directly involved therein 
(see Partridge v. Shepard, 71 Oal. 470, 475 (12 P. -480] ; 
Moore v. Schneider, 196 Cal. 380, 389 [238 P. 81] ; FitzGerald 
v. Terminal De1J. Co., 11 Oa1.App.2d 126, 135-136 {53 P.2d 
177,55 P.2d 194]), it does not constitute such a determination 
of the issues involved as to render them res judicata where 
distinct rights are sought to be litigated in a separate cause 
of action. (United States v. International Building Co., 345 
U.S. 502, 506 [73 8.0t. 807, 97 L.Ed. 1182] ; Lawler v. Na-
tional Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 324, 327 [75 S.Ot. 
865, 99 L.Ed. 1122]; Burgess v. Consider H. Willett, Inc., 
311 Ky. 745 [225 S.W.2d 315, 317] ; Reel16S v. Philadelphia 
Gas Works Co., 107 Pa. Super. 422 [164 A. 132, 134] ; Frue-
hauf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324, 330; Marchant v. 
Buffalo General Hospital, 166 Misc. 234 [3 N.Y.S.2d 496, 
~8] ; see Hall v. Coyle,38 Oal.2d 643, 646 [241 P.2d 236]; 
) 
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Bfark 1'. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839, 843 [129 P.2d 390]; Best., 
Judgmeuts, § 68.) To hold otherwise would tend to defeat 
rather than to promote the objective of preventing vexatious 
litigation with its attendant expense both to the parties and 
the public. Defendant did not have his day in court dur-
ing the first trial on the issue of liability, and plainti1f 
can now justify making that judgment binding upon him 
in her action only on the ground that he had an opportunity 
to attack it. Had he done so, more rather than less litigation 
would have ensued, and plainti1f would have gained nothing. 
Defendant did not vex her by seeking a redetermination of 
an issue once decided, but sought and secured only the right 
to have the issue of liability determined once after plaintiff 
by securing a new trial on all issues had established the 
propriety thereof. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and 
McComb, J., concurred.. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree that a judgment, wllich on its face determines 
the question of liability in a negligence action, is not res 
judicata on that issue by way of collateral estoppel in another 
. action on the theory that the question of liability was not 
decided because the jury in the first action assertedly com-
promised on the issue of liability. Whatever way you cut it, 
the result reached by the majority is that an alleged compro-
mise verdict (balancing liability against the amount of dam-
ages) is subject to collateral attack on that ground. 
The facts are not involved and some legal points are clear 
and these are conceded by the majority. Three plainti1fs 
obtained judgments against defendant in an action in which 
his liability is based, by virtue of the pleadings, the instruc-
tions to the jury, the jury's verdict and the judgment itself, 
on the negligence of the defendant; that issue was necessarily 
involved, indeed, it was the only issue except the fact and 
amount of damages. One of the plainti1fs was granted a new 
trial, but as to the others, the judgment became final, and 
the trial court denied the plea of res judicata on the retrial 
as to the one plainti1f. There was a privity between the 
plainti1f obtaining the new trial and one of the other plaintiffs, 
her husband (see Zarallosa v. Craven, SS Cal.2d 815 (202 P.2d 
• c:.as--.-
) 
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78, 6 AL.R.2d 461]), hence there can be no question that the' 
judgment for the husband-plaintUf was res judicata. . No 
point is made that these judgments for all three plainti1fs were' 
given in the same action, and I take it the situation would be 
no different if they had been obtained in separate and different 
actions. The judgment for the plaintUf-husband was rea 
judicata as it was based upon underlying pleadings which pre-
sented the issue of defendant's liability-his negligence; the 
jury was instructed on that issue; its verdict was general, 
thus deciding that iJBa.e; and the judgment was on the verdict 
and therefore decided that issue. We have, therefore, a dear 
case of the judgment being res judicata on the question of 
defendant's liability as to one-plaintUf-wife-who was in ' 
privity to the plainti1r-husband (Zaragosa v. CrtWefl, IUpra). 
In such a case we have a situation where under the doctrine 
of res judicata, the defendant is collaterally estopped to ques-
tion the final detenmnation that he was negligent. Yet the 
majority arrives at • clitrerent conclusion by reasoning that 
the verdict on whieIL 1he judgment was based was a compro- . 
mise (supposedly 10,.- damages because some jurors thought 
there should be no iiiability) which is true because the judg-
ment as to plaintUf-wife, as to which a new trial was granted, 
was a compromise ~use the damages were lower than the 
amount of the specim1 damages suffered and proved. It is 
then concluded that 4efendant and plaintUf-husband u ac_ 
cepted." the comprtmnise verdict and thUs, in effect, com-
promised the res judiieata judgment; hence there is no col-
lateral estoppel becamse a judgment based on a compromise 
does not give rise til such estoppel. 
Accepting for the: lIIloment that reasoning and speaking to ' 
the legal proposition. '1tiIat a judgment based on a compromise 
settlement cannot gt;:.e rise to a collateral estoppel, I find 
the law to be other'W"!iBe. It is the general rule that a judg-
ment entered by COlDP!Ilt or agreement is res judicata in the 
sense that it is a bar- 'U> another action on the same cause of 
action as distingu.isheri: from collateral estoppel. (Partridge v. , 
Shepard, 71 Cal. 47l1, 475 [12 P. 480] ; City of Oakland v. 
Oaklcmd Water Fr~ Co., 162 Cal. 675, 686 [124 P. 251]; 
Semple v. Wright, ~ Cal. 659; Crossmtln v. Davis, 79 Cal. 
603 [21 P. 963] ; ~ v. Schneider, 196 Cal. 380 [238 P. 
81]; Nielsen v. EmBf'!"sO'n, U9 Cal.App. 214 [6 P.2d 281]; 
Guaranty L. Corp. V"'. Board of Supervisor" 22 Cal.App.2d 
684 [71 P.2d 931]; P1::t"ter,on v. Spring Valley Water Co., 207 ' 
I CaL 739 [279 P.loor:..:, ; Goddu,rd v. 8ecurit1l Title Iv. ct Gv4r. : 
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00.,14 Cal.2d 47, 65 [92 P.2d 804] ; Lamb 1'. HermlOfl,97 Cal. 
App. 193 [275 P. 603]; see also many eases cited 2 A.L.R.2d 
514.) The court states in Partridge v. Shepard, supra, 71 Cal. 
470, 475: "It is objected to the judgment roll in Judson v. 
Molloy, that it was a 'consent judgment.' 
"We know of no good reason why a judgment entered by 
consent of parties in a cause of which the court has jurisdiction 
of the subject-matter and of the parties is less efficacious than 
if entered after a trial of the issues. 
"It may be impeached like any other judicial record, by 
evidence of a want of jurisdiction in the court rendering it, 
by showing collusion between the parties, or by proof of 
fraud on the part of the party offering the record." And the 
lame is true where res judicata G8 collateral estoppel is in-
volved. (See Partridge v. Shepard, I'Upra, 71 Cal. 470; 
Semple v. Wright, supra, 32 Cal. 659; McCreery v. Fuller, 
68 Cal. 80; Crossman v. Davis, supra, '19 Cal. 603; HelpUng v. 
HupUng, 50 CalApp. 676 [195 P. 715] ; FitzGerald v. Penni-
taal Dev. Co., 11 CalApp.2d 126 [63 P.2d 177, 65 P.2d 194].) 
It is said in 2 A.L.R.2d 514, 543: "As a general proposition, 
where a question of fact essential to a judgment is actually 
litigated and determined thereby, the determination is con-
clusive between the parties and their privies in a subsequent 
action, even though such action involves a different cause of 
action. ••• 
·'Except in cases involving tax liability for successive' tax 
periods, it is well settled that a judgmtmt by consent raisu 
.. moppel tn the ,ame way G8 a iv.dgment mfered after 
GO'ntuf, and this has been recognized even by those courts 
which profess to adhere to the theory that a consent judgment 
or decree is, strictly speaking, not res judicata." (Emphasis 
added.) The eases cited in the majority opinion are not 
to the contrary. Hall v. Coyle, 38 Cal.2d 543 [241 P.2d 236], 
and Stark 1'. Ooker, 20 Cal2d 839 [129 P .2d 390], the Cali-
fornia eases, merelynold that an issue withheld from decision 
by the court is not res judicata or that an action on a com-
promise of a claim is not the same as an action on the 
claim. It is said in United States v. International Building 
CD., 845 U.S. 502, 506 [73 S.Ct. 807, 97 L.Ed. 1182]: "A 
judgment entered with the consent of the parties may involve 
a determination of questions of fact and law by the court. 
But unless a showing is made that that was the ease, the 
judgment has no greater dignity, so far as collateral estoppel 
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mise of the parties." LawZor~. NationaZ Scree'll Be,wil1 
Oorp., 349 U.S. 322 [75 S.Ot. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122], reftllSeCl] 
to apply res judicata because to do so would violate an 
portant public policy, the United States anti-trust laws. 
Burgess v. Oonsider H. Willett, I'llC., 311 Ky. 745 [225 S.W 
2d 315], rejected the proposition that a consent judgment 
res judicata, which as seen is squarely contrary to the law 
of this state and nearly all jurisdictions elsewhere. The 
is true of Beeves v. PhiladelphiG GM W orkl 00., 107 
Super. 422 [164'A.132], and Fruehauf TraiZer 00. v. ffltmO~,.e.1 
167 F.2d 324, and the International Building Company 
In Marchant v. BUffGZo General Hospital, 166 Misc. 234 
N.Y.S.2d 496], the issue as to which estoppel by former 
ment was sought was not decided by the former juCigInellt.l 
The decision of the majority is, therefore, contrary to the 
established law of this state. 
In the foregoing discussion I have accepted the proposition 
that this was a consent judgment and pointed out that eVell 
as such it was res judicata, but it was not a consent judgment. 
There was no agreement, settlement or compromise except 
that which the majority imposes as a matter of lGw as dis-
tinguished from the voluntary understanding of the parties, 
The judgment urged as estoppel had been entered. It un-
questionably decided the issue of the defendant's liability. 
It was relldered after a contest in a trial and on the jury's 
verdict. The only consent feature that might arise is because 
defendant did not attack the judgment by appeal or other. 
wise. lie permitted it to become final. Nothing occurred in 
the conduct of the parties nor in any communication betweell 
than that indicated an actual compromise or &greelnellt to 
accept the jury'. so-called compromise. The failure to appeal 
was nothing more than permitting the judgment to stand by 
default, the same as if no answer or contest had been made 
to the complaint and a default judgment was entered. As is 
said in HeZpZi'llg v. HelpZing, 50 Cal.App. 676, 682 [195 P. 
715]: "The appellant'. contelltion that the former judgment 
between the parties hereto did not render matters involved 
therein res oajudiCGta for the reason that it was a consent 
judgment is not bome out to the extent claimed by the 
appellant; for while it appears that the trial judge in an 
informal interview with the parties gave expression to some 
doubts as to the sufiiciency of the evidellce in the case, these 
doubts were not carried into the formal judgment; and it 
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made during the progress of the ease, even though they amount 
to the giving of his reasons for his decision, become no part 
of the judgment, and cannot be held to control or alter its 
substance and effect. So far as the record herein discloses, 
the only matter embraced in said judgment to which it was 
suggested that the parties give their consent was that of the 
amount and duration of the separate maintenance to be al-
.lowed the plaintUf therein. As to all other matters involved 
in the ease the judgment became res adjudicata, and hence 
properly relied upon by the respondent herein to defeat the 
present action." And in Harter v. King County, 11 Wn.2d 
583 [119 P.2d 919, 923]: "We think the very essence of a 
consent decre.e is that the parties thereto have entered vol-. 
untarily into a contract setting the dispute at rest, upon whicb 
contract the court bas entered judgment conforming to the 
terms of the agreement, without putting tbe parties to the 
necessity of proof. " There is bere, therefore, no compromise, 
consent or settlement judgment. If it is a default judgment 
(it became final by default) then we apply the rule that a 
judgment by default is the basis of a plea' of res judicata or 
collateral estoppel in a subsequent action involving the same 
matter, and sucb judgment is just as conclusive upon wbat-
ever is essential to support it as is a judgment after contest. 
(Burtnettv. King, 33 Cal.2d 805, 810 [205 P.2d 657, 12 A.L.R. 
2d 333]; Bohn v. Watson, 130 Cal.App.2d 24 [278 P.2d 454]; 
O'Brien v. Appling, 133 Cal.'App.2d 40 [283 P.2d 289] ; Estate 
01 Williams, 36 Cal.2d 289, 292-293 [223 P.2d 248, 22 A.L.R. 
2d 716] ; Horton v. Horton, 18 Cal.2d 579 [116 P.2d 605] ; 
Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal.App.2d 127 [177 P.2d 364]; 
Morenhout v. Higuera, 32 Cal. 289; Hartson v. Shanklin, 57 
Cal. 558; Harlson v. Shanklin, 58 Cal. 248; MaddU% v. County 
Bank, 129 Cal. 665 [62 P. 264, 79 Am.St.Rep. 143]; Hartley v. 
Griffit'kl, 133 Cal.App. 17, 23 [23 P.2d 532]; Kittridge v. 
Stevens, 16 Cal. 381; Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 1 [147 P. 
1168]; Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 8 [147 P. 1171] ; Wattson v. 
Dillon, 6 Cal.2d 33 [56 P.2d 220] ; San Gabriel Valley Bank v. 
Lake View Town Co., 7 Cal. Unrep. 266 [86 P. 727] ; Fry v. 
Baltimore HoM Co., 80 Cal.App. 415 [252 P. 752]; 128 
A.L.R. 472; 29 Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 235.) 
We are left, then, with no agreement, compromise or settle-
ment, with nothing more than a judgment whose roll on its 
face unquestionably decides the question of defendant's lia-
bility. Even assuming that that judgment was tbe result of a 
compromise by the jurors, it must create an estoppel-be res 
11 
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judicata-unless it may be ignored by reason of some legal~ 
ground on which it may be attacked. When such an attack I 
. is made in response to a plea of res judicata as to such a' 
judgment, it is collateral (Gagnon 00., Inc. v. Nevada Desert 
Inn, 45 Ca1.2d 448 [289 P.2d 466]) and the majority opinion 
cites no authority for collaterally attacking a judgment on the 
ground that the jury reached its verdict underlying the 
judgment by compromise. Indeed, the majority opinion ad-
mits a collateral attack is not available because it says a 
res judicata judgment is final and binding as between the 
immediate parties thereto. It is no answer to say that the 
judgment is not res judicata because being based on a com-
promise verdict the issue of liability was not determined. 
(See supra, quotation from HeZpling v. HeZpling, 50 Cal.App. 
676, 682.) If the jury did not decide that issue, it decided 
nothing, and the judgment entered on its verdict would not 
be binding on the parties thereto. To say it did not decide 
the issue is to ignore the pleadings, verdict and judgment, and 
to permit a collateral attack on the judgment which is not. 
permitted. 
If the majority opinion is permitted to stand, every judg-
ment entered on a verdict in a personal injury action where 
the amount of the verdict is less than the special damages 
proved, will be void and subject to collateral attack even after 
it becomes final. In other words, there will be no judgment 
and the case will remain undetermined to the same extent as 
if the jury had failed to agree on either the issue of liability 
or damages. The foregoing conclusion must follow from 
the reasoning of the majority, as the judgment in favor of 
plainti1i-husband, which established defendant's liability for 
the injuries suffered by both husband and wife, became final, 
and must be res judicata unless it may be collaterally attacked. 
If it may be collaterally attacked, it is void, and the ease, 
even as to plainti1i-husband, has not been determined. I am 
sure the majority would not consciously so hold. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment and instruct the 
trial court to proceed to trial on the sole issue of the amount 
of damages sWfered by Virginia. 
